


## Problem:

**RAG:** LLMs that retrieve external documents for grounded answers.

**Knowledge Corruption Attack:** attacker inject **fake texts** into databases mislead RAG outputs.

**Our Finding:** Past attacks succeed mainly because the **fake data overwhelms real data!**



Only 1 or 2 correct data per document!

**But attacker inject 5 fake data to run the attack!**

## Hypothesis:


**H0:** The attack success rate (ASR) is the same regardless of **benign-to-fake ratio**.

## Experiment:

With 5 adversarial corpus per query, we add 5 query relevant benign corpus and track ASR. On Natural Questions dataset, **ASR drops by half** from 98% and 83% to 31% and 42%, indicating attack dilution.

Top k	Adv / query	Benign / query	ASR mean	Precision Mean	Recall Mean
5	1	0	65.00%	20.00%	99.00%
5	3	0	84.00%	59.00%	98.00%
5	5	0	98.00%	96.00%	96.00%
5	5	5	31.00%	42.00%	42.00%
10	5	0	83.00%	50.00%	99.00%
10	5	5	42.00%	49.00%	98.00%

## Framework Overview:



- **Knowledge corruption attack** in the **red box** inject LLM-crafted query relevant **fake** corpus into the database;
- **Document augmentation defense** in the **blue box** injects LLM-crafted query relevant **benign** corpus into the database;
- The RAG system **gives correct answers** under the knowledge corruption attack!
- It can **generalize to any existing RAG architecture** with minimal effort.

## Conclusion:

**The results reject H0.** More benign, query relevant data sharply reduces ASR. **The attack is much weaker in practice.** This highlights document augmentation defense as a simple, effective way to protect RAG systems.